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Provicling what we believe ou앙ht 10 be the economics 
perspective , this paper introcluces an approach to unclerstancling 
the economic ancl political forc원 clriving economic clevelopment. 
Acloptecl here is a vertical view ‘:)f the world , through which the 
notion of economic discriminatio t1 (ED) plays a central role. ED , 
it is argued is a necessary conclition for economic clevelopment, 
while its negation , egalitarianism , which seems much prev따ent 
in moclern-day clemocracies , is the seed 10 economic digression 
This paper also traces the gro'Wth of egalitarianism in classical 
Western political philosophy , and also weighs the imporlance 
ancl relevance of the ED paradi딩m in t11e backdrop of classicaI 
ancl neoclassical economic thought. To further illustrate its 
usefulness , we speculate on the clevelopment potentials of vari 
ous types of regimes utilizing a political-economy axis ‘ 
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I. Introduction 
It would not be far from the truth to claim that the birth of 
economics as a separate discipline begins with the ambition to find 
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the “ magic formula" in building and sustaining a developed 
economy. Quite evidently , this ambition to understand how to 
create an economy in which every member of society would be free 
to live with minimal material constraints was at the center of Adam 
Smith's The Wealth oJ Nations published in 1776. The key to 
economic development, despite even more intense study since the 
1940s , has however continued to evade even the most brilliant 
minds , and it remains a sad fact that a large part of the world’S 
population remains in the grips of poverty. Poverty, rather than 
wealth , it would seem , is an inescapable feature of the human 
existence. 
On the other hand , traditional economics , given all its strengths 
and weaknesses , cannot entirely be blamed for the current human 
condition. Politics too has also been critical in shaping the course 
of history, and in many cases , has adversely affected development. 
Be as it may , it remains difficult to separate economic and political 
reasons for societies' condition and ch밍1ge. One might hope that 
by revisi디ng 야le philosophies of these disciplines , one could 
somehow deal with this identification problem. But , unlike political 
philosophy , which has been the deliberation of many philosophers 
since the early Greek philosophers , a comparable economic phi 
losophy is largely absent. There are of course some important 
philosophical themes that the economists have addressecl , but these 
cleal with specific and narrow issues , e.g. , inquiries have concerned 
(a) rational choice , (b) the appraisal of economic outcomes , 
institutions and processes , or (c) the ontolo앓T of economic 
phenomena ancl the possibilities of acquiring knowledge of them. 1 
However , a major or “ grand" philosophy that can claim to provicle a 
vision for economics , ancl par디cularly ， clevelopment economics 
seems altogether lacking. What is equally worrisome is that the 
neoclassical economics paradigm , which has been the workhorse of 
economists since the late-19th century, has not provicled a “ grand" 
philosophy and in fact , for this reason , has been much influenced 
by philosophies of other disciplines , including egalitarian political 
philosophy , which , we will argue , has tended to misguicle thinking 
about economic development. 1n a sense , economics seems to have 
actecl only as a mere tool for “ grand" political designs ancl 
ISee the entry “ Philosophy of Economics" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy 
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consplraCles. 
Arguably development carries w1th it a multitude of questions 
that beg answers from a variety 0 1" disciplines. For example , to give 
some explanation on , say , pover1:y ‘ further questions of institutiomi , 
policy , technology, and so on , would usua11y be provoked. Hence. l( 
is no1: easy to find a simple and 앙eneralizable theory that captures 
as much of the development process as possible. In this paper. 
however , we would like to believe that the economic discrimination 
(ED) conc:ep1: does precisely this. By setting up two principles c,f 
development economics ‘ we believe that the ED paradigm can help 
us not only provide clues to the many development problems in èl 
simple and effective way , but also might provi.de us ‘ and this is 
very ambitious admittedly , with a starting point for a ‘ grand" 
economic philosophy. 
TI1is p a.per looks a 1: poli디cal institutions and economic develop-
menL For many modern day dernocracies. it seems that its best 
choice is 1:0 adopt the market system , but rnore often than not. thê 
initial enihusiasm about markeis laier gives way to some readjust 
men t, often led by egalitarian ethos , as the inevitable inequalities of 
economic outcomes , as often foreseen , actua11y materialize. Ai such 
times , economics often stands aside , almost appearing defenseless 
under the weight of egalitarian-seeking politics. The notion cf 
economic discrimination (ED) is at the heart o[ the paper’ 5 
conceptual and analytical framework ‘ whic:h we believe has a major 
advantage in a110wing for the separa디on of economics and politics 
Discrimination is ubiquitous in socieiy and in a11 types o[ humall 
interactioTl. We are not here referring to racial or gender discrimi-
nation. Rather , the original meaning of disc:rimination i.e. , the act 
of distinguishing, which is the act of making or obseπing a 
difference. is emphasized. 2 When people 당et. together or when they 
think about something or someone , it is almost a psychological 
inevi1:ableness that each engage in const:an 1: evaluation , of course in 
differen1: intensities , of oneself and of others. That such discrimi 
nation is critical in the behavi.or of people is uncont.roversial. What 
is surprisllng is that economic theory has completely ignored the act 
of such discrimination in their body of analyses. 
Section II introduces and formalizes key concepts of this paper. 
2Webster ’s 1828 Dictiona밍， Electron ‘ c Version by Christian Technologie“ 
Inc 
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specifically economic discrimination (ED) and the principles and 
corollaries of economic development. Following the establishment of 
the anti-thesis of ED in the form of 갱galitarianism ，" we trace the 
roots of egalitarianism in Section III , which overviews the major 
Western classical political philosophies in chronological order. In 
Section N , we return to economics discussing the merits of the ED 
approach in the backdrop of the classical and neoclassical 
economics. especially in de며ing with economic development. In 
Section V , we introduce a simple way to interpret political and 
economic regimes , and verifY how the ED paradigm might help 
explain potentials and vulnerabilities. We ask “What types of 
politìcal-economics regimes are compatible (or not compatìble) with 
development?" Sectìon vl concludes with some remarks. 
11. Economic Discrimination (ED): Introduction and 
Formaliza tion 
Pick up two English dictionaries , a modern one and another of. 
say. a 100 years back. and one is likely to find that the word 
“ discrimination" has remained more or less the same with the 
exception that the more recent version will contain a negative 
meaning ha띠ng some phrase such as , “ prejudiced or prejudicial 
outlook. action. or treatment (racial discrimination)."3 The modern 
usage of the word is often extended to mean the classification of 
people into different groups and according the members of each 
group distinct. and typically treating one group less favorably than 
others on such grounds as race (racism). gender (sexism). religion 
(religious discrimination) , height, ethnic background. national origin ‘ 
disability. sexual orientation , preference or behavior , age or political 
views , and so on. What has been the reason for this change. of 
what was quite an innocent word , to one that carries with it such 
cruel injustices and pr멍udice? We are not philologists. but a rough 
guess would point the finger at poli디cs. 
To help clear the ground , it should be usefu l, therefore. to start 
with a definition of discrimination that is to be adopted in 
discussions throughout this paper. Going back to the original 
meaning ‘ discrimination is “ treating differences differently" with 
3Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. 
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respect to some defined standard. To elaborate a little. we would 
like to qualifY the word .. treat" in line with incentive structureE,. 
That is. positive feedback can be expected if treatment is favorably 
applied. otherwise not. Second. the phrase “ treat differences 
differently" means above all that differences should not be treated 
as equals. and that different players often deserve to be treated 
differently. But where do differences lie? This brings us to the third 
and critical imp아tant point. We would su앓est that differences aE~ 
defined 0 1' definable with respect t:o some standard 0 1' benchmark 
That is. differences are meaningless outside a pre- or simultane 
ously established standard. Fourtb. the reference point or target. 
which could be tangible or intangible. should be “ acceptable." 
Actually. this cOl). cli디on is t디띠al since standards are “ acceptable" by 
definition if it is used to determine differences. A further point 
worth men디oning is that for differences to exist. there should be 
some diversity. i.e .. on the minimum. at least two entities should 
exist that have cliscemable clifferences vis-à 띠s some standard. 
Lastly ‘ standards are estabHshed often enclo당enously and sometimes 
spontaneously under the auspice딩 of. say. a single discriminator 
(say. a dictator. a single ruler. etc.) or of a variety of discriminators 
(say , players ìn the market place. etc.) More precisely. treatmen t. ill 
our interpreta디on. is the prerogative of the discriminator. Hence 
[orth. a definition of economic discrimination (ED) follows: 
Dξfinition: 1: Economic discrimination (ED) is treating difference:, 
as clifference by rewarding better economic actors more favorabη 
according to their contribution. 
A concrete example should help us go beneath this definition. In 
the economy. export sales could be an important “ standard'’ or 
reference of economic performance. The government or the markel 
might even set such economic standards 一 that is. either the 
government or market (or both) often act as the discriminator(s).4 
With a diverse number of expor디n당 firms opera디ng in the economy. 
differences in export performance across these firms are identifiable 
(this corresponds to the “ diversity" and “ differentiability" require-
ment). Now. for ED to complete its course. the discriminator 
끼II/e might refer to these as “딩ovemment-led discrimination“ and 
“market -led discrimination ," respectively 
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(government or market) should treat differences in export perfor-
mance by rewarding better firms more favorably (again , we 
emphasize that it is in this sense that the word “ treat" should be 
understood , i.e. , consistent with economic incentives).5 Hence , it is 
easy to see how a system based on ED “ helps those that help 
themselves. " 
But one might ask then how ED is related to development. This 
question in fact provokes the most basic of all ques디ons ， 매That is 
economic development?" Economists can often be heard speaking of 
economic growth , which is traditionally measured as the rise in per 
capita income measured in US dollars. Although a useful indicator , 
per capita income has been found to be in many ways an 
insufficient measure of development. For example , it is easy to find 
that countries with similar per capita incomes can differ sub-
stantially in their level of development. It would appear that 
development is just too complex a phenomenon to be captured by a 
single numerical index. 6 Rather than define development by a 
quantitative measure , for the purposes of this paper , we wish to 
emphasize development’ s dynamism as the “movement towards 
success." A working definition is provided as follows: 
D앙inition 2: Economic development , through which society 
becomes successful. does not only consist of the expansion of 
material wealth , but also entails the “ spirit of development." 
Here , the phrase “ spirit of development" is used to capture all 
other aspects of human progress outside o[ the εxpansion of 
material wealth. For example , the Chinese people with per capita 
income o[ less than a tenth of Korea seem more hopeful and eager 
for development. 7 Amongst the various notions of progress that 
"This is again related to the setting up of a “ developmental.ladder" in the 
socio-economic fabric , which a110ws for progressl development 
"It is interesting to note that Sala-i-martin (1 997) ran over two million 
regressions to determine factors of economic gro\\πh. A large number of 
variables were considered on the RHS of the multivariable regression ‘ with 
some combinations proViding a good statistical model, while others did not 
The various combinations were used to say something about statistical 
robustness , but the fact of the matter is that none of the RHS variables 
can be said to be a “ necessary‘’ or ‘ 'sufficient" factor for development. Such 
is the state of the neoclassical gro\\πh theories 
7Arguably , a much larger propoπion of the Korean people in the 1980s ‘ 
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might enter into the “ spirit of development,’ we would like to stress 
that cognition about development is most cri디ca1. 8 Although nDt 
adclressed much in moclern economics , cognition , or if you like , 
recognition9 is an important feature of economic life that motivates 
us to create and accumulate material wealth. A re-reading of the 
Adam Smith clearly points to the facl that it is no t. physical 
necessity why people seek riches ancl shun poverty , but rather , the 
satisfying of our vanity is why people seek to better their conditio l1. 
People go through “ the toil and bustle of" economic life “ to be 
observed , to be attended to , to be taken noUce of with sympaLhy ‘ 
complacency ‘ and approbation"'The rich man glor피es in his riches , 
because he feels that they naturally draw upon him the aUention 
of lhe world." .The poor man , on the contrary , is ashamed 0 1' his 
poverty. He feels that it either places him out of the sighl of 
mankind. “ 10 To lhis we could 딘asily replace “ is ashamed" Wil.h 
"feels guilty ," but the upshot ìs that recogniUon counls , a Ild 
economic incentives for material progress should be made 
consistent with our cognition. In sum , behind this cognition 
process is the condiUon that contribution to society be recognized , 
through appropriately rewarding each to one ’s contribution (i. e .. lhe 
more the contribution to society‘ the greater should be th t:i r 
reward). The wisdom of “ God helps those that help themselves" 
could be a useful guide. In fact , tbe enUre cognition-reward syslem 
might simply be referred to as economic discrimination (ED).ll 
U깨1at is important to realize is that by guaranteeing reward 10 
economic players in an incentive-consistent manner i. e. , accordillg 
to one ’s contribution , the strengthening of ED helps erect the 
societies ’ developmental-ladder l2 needed for growth and develop-
for example , can be said to be in the 녕pirit of development" than they 
presently are 
8At this point , one might recall Hegel ’ S “ struggle for recognition" (Kampf 
um Anerkennung) in his explanation of the development of history. 
9A comprehensive and accessible discussion on recognition is Markell 
(2003). 
lOSmith (1759 , pp. 50-1). Also see Fleischacker (2004). 
llThis paper, while stressing that material awards and recognition for 
contributing 10 ones' society is important, somewhat ignores the facl lhat 
cases abound when ones ’ contribution can be difficult to measure. Howevcl ‘ 
our enquiry cloes not take us to such issues , i. e. , the problem of free ricling 
and moral hazard is well known and has been widely researched in the 
economics literature 
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ment. ED is definitely about incentives. Our understanding of 
“ incentives ’‘ however differs somewhat from common usage. which 
usual is used to mean merely “reac디ng to one’s surroundings." 
Such reaction could be of an infinite variety and might not have 
any direction at all or. at best. might just be marginal. In the ED 
paradigm. by providing a concrete economic development theory 
that links incentives with specific developmental go외s. the simple 
interpreta디on of incentives is much augmented. Rewards should be 
commensurate with contributions. But definitions of what is worth 
achie띠ng. at least to a certain degree. in the first place must be 
defined (or. at least. cues should be in place) in advance of actions. 
Goals must be considered worthy before we go about production. 
for ex없nple. The capacity to create value depends on properly 
aligned incentives. which is exactly what ED provides. Furthermore. 
with ED , specific means and ends of the economic development 
process are identifiable. Be as it may , ED makes way for each 
economic actor to either climb up to success or down to failure. 
We state the first principle of economic development links ED \\끼th 
economic development as follows: 
Principle 1: Economic discrimination (ED) is a necessary condition 
for economic development. 
Again , we repeat that the merits of an economy that is based on 
ED is that it “ helps those that help themselves." All too common , 
we can find examples in which rewards are not linked to 
performance , say , because of reasons of p이itics ， ethics , tradition. 
etc. But. surely , a society that rewards equally all members. say , 
by 1/ n is both regressive and de-motivating. And. witll regard to 
income distribution , we would take on the simplistic position of 
“ reward one according to one’ s contribution."13 In the ED paradigm. 
12Jt is easy to understand that social 잉ld economic progress is onJy 
possibJe if some in-built deveJopmentaJ ladder is pJaced firmly in the 
country‘ s sociaJ and economic system. If 머1 capabJe individuals. firms. 
organizations and so on. (not markets) are on this Jadder. then sureJy 
society on the whoJe is Jikely to advance. 
13Note that we have not said “propoπionately." We have not also asked 
whether this is “ fair" or ‘JUs t." The question of income distribution is highly 
controversial. Let it suffice for now to say that what is appropriate differs 
across societies and across time 
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we feel it unnecessary to complicate the “ treatment" process on tbe 
lines of Llohn Stuart Mill or of LJohn Rawls. 14 who by adhering 1.0 
the argument that basic “ rights" are to be obseπed‘ argue that tf:e 
poor be ’‘blessed" for “not having made it." which we feel sharpiy 
contradicts those agreeable to tbe saying. ‘help those thai help 
themselves." The redistribution ques디on. and particular how it 
relates to ED. will be more elaborately discussed in later part ()f 
this pape r. We will also discuss i떠 relation to the concept of Pareto 
efficiency.15 
Interestingly to note is that the intensily of ED can be visualized 
or 당auged by the degree of "verticalness" or “ uprightness" 01 
society’ s hypothetical developmentιtl laddεr - the more upright it is ‘ 
the more the potential for economic development. otherwise. if lying 
down. economic digression is sure to set in. This visualization 
stems from the view that the “ grand" economic pbilosophy ougbt to 
view the world as a “vertical" structure. which is distinguisbed frorn 
the political perspective that looks at its world as “ horizontal." The 
dichotomy of worldviews in philosophies is a fascinating feature of 
human thought. which has a strong tradition in the likes of Rene 
Descartes ’s “ rationalism" and John Locke’s “ empiricism." ln a sensc. 
it would seem that Hegel was rigbt to suggest that the progress (If 
history does indeed take on a dialectical structure. Adding to this. 
the nature of the arguments in this paper suggests that politiCé ll 
philosophy has been diametrically opposed to economic philosophy. 
with the former adopting a horizontal world-view. which we strongly 
suggest ought to be confronted with the development of the laUer’s 
vertical \1v'eltanschauung. 16 or the “ grand" economic philosophy. 
Given that ED is a necessary condition for development. then its 
negation (not-ED) should be a sufficient condition for economic 
digression. Put. differently. digression is defined as 야le reverse (lf 
economic development. and as such. if the necessary condition (ED) 
is absent then digression is bouncl to result ‘ The nega디on of ED is 
what we call “ egalitarianism." which might simply be defìned as 
“ treating difference the same" or as the “mitiga디on of differences." 
The second principle of economic development follows: 
l"These two important writers and their political philosophies wi lJ be 
discussed in the fi이lowing section. 
l5Also see Corollary 2 below. 
16Weltanschauung is the combination of two German words. Welt (world)+ 
Anschauung (띠ew). 
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Principle 2: Egalitarianism is a sufficient condition for economic 
digression. 
We will trace the development of egalitarianism in classical 
poli디cal philosophy in the next section. For now , we quickly 
provide two important corollaries of the Principles of economic 
developmen t. The first corollary concerns diversity of economic 
actors. It is a logical necessity that for ED to be possible , 야lere 
must be some diversity of economic players , be it individuals , 
firms , non-profit institutions , and so on. Hodgson (1 999) highlights 
the importance of diversity or inequali디es for the survival or 
sustainability of populations , and has argued that it is impossible 
to see change (evolution) without diversity. Furthermore , inequality 
of resource entitlements arising from inequali디es in dominance (a 
type of diversi띠 also plays an important role in the sustainability 
of species involved in contest competition. Be as it may , we can 
write out the first corollarγ of the ED paradigm as follows: 
Corollary 1: Diversity precedes ED , or ED is impossible without 
diversity. 
The second corollarγ refers to what _we call the “ conglomeration" 
effect. Since , successful agents are better rewarded , resources tend 
naturally to gravitate to successful actors. This is a verγ common 
feature. It is easy to see that a wide range of differences in wealth , 
income. reward , success. social status. education , knowledge , 
authority, ambition , opportunity, and even luck. accompanies 
development experiences. ED is consistent with the observations of 
conglomera디on as a natural feature of economic progress. We state 
corollary 2 as follows: 
Corollary 2: Conglomera디on (amalgamation) of economic resources 
and activities is a natural process of economic development. 
The significance , and commonality of “ conglomeration" in eco-
nomic development cannot be overemphasized. In fact , economic 
development from the beginning of time and throughout the history 
of civilization can be understood as the series of major events of 
the conglomeration of economic (and non-economic) rεsources and 
activities. In the beginning of mankind , we can imagine that the 
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hunter-gatherer (although taking quite a long time , according lo 
anthropologistsl realized that they could be more successful if he 
were able to co-ordinate his activi.ties with others. With the birth of 
agricultu :re. and with more time to spend in other economic 
activities such as craft. which helped secure a better future ‘ and 
eventually with trade becoming an irnporLant activity. societies were 
transformed through the building of irade centers and ciUes. 17 This 
process o[ conglomeration. or coagula디on. 18 if you like , has bet:n 
the great leverage upon which societies have advanced. 
Ha띠ng laid down two Principles and two Corollaries of 
development economics. we now rnove to see how the antithesis o[ 
ED. i.e. egalitarianism. was borne and nurtured in classical 
Western poliUcal philosophy and eventual1y in democracy. befo.~e 
returning to economics to discus선 how. in turn. the ED paradigm 
introduced here weighs in against the major economic schools 
111. Egalitarianism in Classical Political Phi1osophy 
Rccall that Principlc 2 states that cgalitarianism is a sufficicn( 
condition to economic digression. In this scction we trace t!te 
genesis and growth of egalitarian:ism in political philosophy. whil II 
should be \lseful not only in placing into perspective the gcncsis 
and growth of egalitarianism and its insti t.u t.ionalization in the for l11 
of democracy. but also in understanding how it might have 
influenced the histOlγ of civilizations. We focus on classical Western 
political philosophy. which arguably has bet‘n a significant guide in 
the build:ing of what we believe to be an ideal. equaI society.l 9 
lïSee North and Thomas (1 973) and Jacobs (1984). 
181n a sense Ridley (1998) interpreμltion of lhe coagulation process is n.)( 
unlike ours: he suggests 3 distinct st‘핑es of coagulation amongst humans: 
1) the coagulation of the human genes towards a cooperative team for OV'èr 
one billion years. 2) the coagulation of our ancestors into a cooperating 
society for over one million years. and finally 3) the coagulation of humu1 
thought and its origins for one thous,md years. What is interesting is that 
Ridley argues that specialization and the division of labor among humans is 
not an evolutionarily recenl consequences of urban civilization or tl te 
Indllstrial Re、rollltion. but rather has been ingramed in the hllrnan psycltc 
[or a veη long time through the natUl-al selection of the “ selfish gcm“ 
1<\Ve appreciate an earlier cornment of this paper that we do not discUó iS 
Eastern !1otions of egalitarianism. Let it suffice to say that , for the purposνs 
01 1 his pape r. we need not enter the 、 reatment (lf Eastern philosophies rlill 
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An important and perplexing ques디on in political philosophy is 
“W마o should rule?" Such questions hit at the center of meaning of 
human “ liberty" and “ equality," both of which , arguably , are central 
to human freedom. 20 ln the West , some 2000 years back, Plato 
(427 -34 7 BC) developed his political philosophy that argued for the 
gran디ng of absolute autho디ty to a special group for the purposes 
of ruling the society.21 Many philosophers since have argued 
however that the imposi디on of authority was the worst possible 
social evil. Thomas Hobbes (1 588-1679). one of the earliest politic떠 
philosophers , however, although not completely agreeing with 
Hobbes , believed that the evils of a society without strong authority 
were worse than the evils of absolute power granted to authority. 
Hobbes ’s theory is based on the view that people are by nature 
selfish and egois디C ， 22 and as such , left to their own would only 
lead to a situation of chaos. Hence , society is viewed as a kind of 
compromise or “ covenant" that people enter into - an agreement 
among people - to abide by a certain set of rules , or “ conventions , " 
for a beUer life. A major problem of the Platonic ancl Hobessian 
view is that they have been thought to leacl to anti-clemocratic 
authoritarian governments. ln a sense , Plato ancl Hobbes seem to 
favor a government for the people. but not by the people , ancl later 
on philosophers rejected the gran디ng of absolute rule to the 
government. Another version of the criticism of Plato and Hobbes is 
that a society run by a few will tend to stultifY the development of 
most of the people who live in it. The experiences of many 
countries in which an elite class or group of people have ruled 
however show mixecl results , and it is not correct to generalize that 
authoritarian governments do not help development. ln fact , there 
only because we need to look at one (already large) proportion of political 
philosophy, but 머so because Westem poli디C려 philosophy is the basis of 
modern democracy that has also spread rapidly around the world including 
to countries in the East. 
20Aristotle argues that ‘'if libe띠I 없ld equ려ity ， as is thought by some , are 
chiefly to be found in democracy , they will be best aUained when all 
persons alike share in government to the utmost.'‘ 
21Plato was much influenced by his teacher. the equally important 
ancienl philosopher Socrates , who did not conceal his contempt for some of 
the weaknesses of democracy , 와ld was in fact 녕xecuted" by having to 
drink the fatal hemlock for being an “ enemy of democracy." 
2ZHobbes tells that the llfe of man “ is solitary , poor , nasty, brutish and 
short." 
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have been economies thai have grown beUer during times <,f 
auUlOritarian governmenis than during times of democracy.2:3 
The iheoretical roots of egalitarianism ancl democracy as it exists 
in the modern world can be tracecl to John Locke (1632-1704). 
whose Second 깐eat.ise on Civil Govemmε nt was greatly infiuential 
in forming the political philosophy of ihe American and the French 
republics. In many ways. 1ρcke’s philosophy is diametrica11y 
opposed 10 Plato's and to Hobbes’s. For example. Locke makes a 
distinction between life in “ a state of nature" and life in “ a state of 
war." the latter seemingly meant 10 apply to Hobbes ’s view. Lock간 
has a more positive view of man. arguing that ihe rcason for 
people to leave the “ state of naturc" and to form societies was to 
deal wiih difficulties in applying punishment to those who 
transgressed the law. That is. people by a voluntary agreement 
among 1hemselves form societies to erect instiiutions for thη 
purposes of remeclying the defects of life without organized society. 
Consequently. for Locke , law , not force , is the basis of governmenl 
a governmen1 without law , he ar딩ues ， wi.ll be tyrannical. 
Democracy in 1ρcke‘s formulation can be clefined as governmenl 
by laws which are arrived at aHer long deliberation by properly 
chosen representa디ves of the people , ancl which are promulgated so 
that everyone in society may be acquain1ed with them. Such 
democracies , according to 1ιocke ， respect certain areas of humaJl 
conduct that are immune from governmental interference , which he 
calls “ rights." And , although he does not provide any reasons , such 
“ rights." Locke argues , were to be grantecl equa11y among a11 men 
Furthermore , Locke emphatica11y pointed out , in particular , that no 
government could justly take away a person ’s private “ property ’ 
(i. e. , man ’ s life and liberty as well as his possession) .24 The notioIl 
of “ rights" is interes디ng in that it is an ídea easíly moldecl with th( ‘ 
other important idea of “equ외ity." In a sense , the marriage of 
“ equal" and “ rights" seems to have become established in modern 
societies since Locke. 
“ Equality" and “ equal" are incomplete predicates that necessarily 
generate a further ques디on: “ Equal with respect to what7"25 In 
21'his is of course not to say that non-democratic regimes are always 
better in bringing about economic development (Le. , what is kno‘π1 as the 
‘ Iιee hypothesis." after 야le Singaporean leader Lee Kuan-Yeu) 
24Hobbes and Rousseau , another grrat phllosopiler, would have stron당1)' 
disagreed. as they held that property is a creation of society. 
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politic외 philosophy, at least since Locke , the answer has been 
“ equal 디ghts." Up to this point, the economists in general would 
not have much to quarrel about. What is disturbing is that much 
of the “ qualifYing" of equality, which is not terribly difficult, seems 
to have been even further leveraged from the idea of “ equal rights" 
leading to , for example , the notions of “ equaI opportunity," “ equal 
welfare." “ equal distribution ," “ equal capability," “ equal outcome ‘” 
etc. , all of which , at least to certain degrees , would provoke the 
economist. 26 Such metamorphosis has allowed the notion of 
“ equality" and especially that of “ egalitarianism" to permeate , almost 
seamlessly and at times amazingly, into economic life. Most 
importantly, and we shall discuss this further , equality in its 
prescriptive usage ha띠ng a close connection with morality and 
jus디ce in general , as well as with distrtbutive jus디ce in particular, 
has influenced economic theory and policy. Put differently , 
economics , because it has lacked its own “ major" philosophy , has 
not been insulted from poli디cs ， and specifically has had to suffer 
the burden of egalitarianism. 
Let us labor a little longer on the notion of “ equal rights" and 
“ liberty." In the US constitution , which has become a major 
reference point for most countries wishing to adopt a democratic 
government. an important phrase is , “ We hold these truths to be 
self-evident. that all men are created equal. that they are endowed 
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights , that among these 
are Life. Liberty. and the pursuit of Happiness." Here , both 
“ equality" and “ liberty" are given equal weights. The original version 
written by Jefferson reads ‘ “ ... that from that equal creation they 
derive rights inherent and inalienable , among which are the 
preservation of life , and liberty , and the pursuit of happiness": in 
the origin려 draft the value of liberty is explicitly said to be 
secondary to , and derivative from , the value of 갱quality." Clearly , 
깨quality" is championed over “ liberty." Such is the force of 
“equali양" as an independent idea influencing the history of society. 
Arguably , economist must heed to this fac t. 27 
25See Rae (1981). 
260 f course there are other qualification such as “ equal before the law‘” 
for example , that are compatible with ED 
27The controversy between liberty and equality has been a verγ highly 
debated issue in political science. at least since Alexis de Tocqueville’s 
two-volume masterpiece. Democracy in America (1 835. 184이 While 
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Locke ’s political philosophy is however not without problems. anrl 
it would seems that he failed to realize that the majority itself cεn 
become a tyranny and can provf‘ to be a despotism as fierce as 
any monarch in submerging the minority. This is precisely whe~e 
John Stuart Mill (1 806-73) enters 1.0 ‘complete" the democratic 
theory. Mill argued 야1at no government can be a democracy 
without allowing for the protection 이‘ minorities. 1n his On Libert 'J, 
where Mill discusses the limits of power of society over the 
individual. he argues that the aim of libertarians was to set limiLs 
to the power of the ruler over his/her citizens through either or 
both the “ doctrine of rights" (in line with Locke before him) and 
“ constituLional checks" (such as the declaration of war). Without 
going in10 further details. it shoulcl be credited to Mill for his 
liberal views and utilitarian concept that have hacl and continue .. 0 
have a great in f1uence on civilizaUon. 
The discussion up to now tell of how political philosophy has 
moved [rom an authoritarian to an increasingly democrati<、 positio!l. 
and at the same time , it has inc :reasingly embraces egalitarianisL1 
The philosophical transition towards egali1arianism was continucd 
by Karl Marx (1 818-83) , who like Locke ancl Mill favored the liberLy 
view and wanted to see the people rule , developed ironically into a 
philosophy that led to practical consequences inimical to individual 
liberty and freedom. A truer picture of Marx’s cloctrine would 
require us to start with the Hegelian dialectic methodolo양. Bu t. 
this would take us too far astray from the argument we wish lo 
make ancl a brief statement should suffice. Arguably , Marx was 
perhaps the first of political philosophers to fully study the 
workings of capitalism , and his basic conc!usion is that the 
intrinsic contradictions o[ capitalism , the struggle between labor 
and capital and the consequent class warfare are what need to he 
corrected. Socialism was envisioned to be the next and better (if 
n01 fjnal) destination of 1he progress of history. According to Marx ’ S 
Tocqueville ’、vas mainly concerned wìth the threat thal equality - political ‘ 
social ancl economie - posecl for poli t.ical liberty and person머 inlerdepe n-
clence" (Dahl 1985 , p. 2) , a concern that anticipates other similar enqllirk~s 
as well ‘ for example. concerning “ the relationships between political equality. 
political liberty. and economic liberty" (D따11 1985. p. 6) , in this paper we 
can be interpreted as posing an even further extencled qllestion I)y 
adclressinμ the lensions of political equality , political liberly , econO lTl ic 
equality (cgalitarianism) and economic liberty (ED). 
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theory of surplus value , which pinpoints to the source of conflict 
between capit머ist and worker, the concentration of capital would 
lead to the natural rate of profit to drop thereby bringing about the 
co11apse of the capitalist class and the coming of socialism. This 
however has not been confirmed by history, and Marxism has 
largely been discredited after the fa11 of communism in the former 
Soviet Union in the late-1980s.28 What is notable is that with 
Marxism , we find that the notions of equality and that of 
egalitarian are upheld to their extreme form - social classes as we11 
as individual differences disappear. 
Nearly a11 these classical schools continue to be represented by 
various authors up 디11 this day.29 A neither complete list nor fu11 
discussion of all the import밍1t schools is possible here , but we will 
conclude this section with a discussion of John Rawls (1921-2002). 
a defender of the democratic forms of the welfare state , and 
particularly referring to his A Theory oJ Justice , which is perhaps 
regarded the most important book produced by an American 
political theorist in recent years. Also we choose Rawls because it 
a110ws us to further discuss the concept of “equality," which has 
been thought to play a major role in a theory of jus디ce. The 
conception of justice is in fact egalitarian when it views equality as 
a fundamental goal of justice. 
Rawls’s defense of liberal democracy has strong roots in Locke ‘ 
Mill and Kant. Like Locke and Mill. he believes that it is a 
condition of any form of legitimate government. whether it be 
self-governing or a community in which people are free to choose 
their leader , that it be democratic in principle. But. unlike Locke , 
Rawls does not believe that such a society must be committed to 
the defense of private property as a right. He believes , rather , that 
a ‘good" society should distribute its wealth in such a way that 
poverty is minimized. In a sense , Rawls takes the liberties that 
Mills refers to , which protects the individual from government 
tyranny to be fundamenta l, but unlike Mill he is not a utilitarian 
28rnterestingly, some authors continue to maintain that capitalism is still 
doomed to collapse and in fact has so far been 녕aved" by imagina디vely 
adop디ng 녕ocialist" measures 
29Philosophers like Karl Popper (1902-94) , Robert Nozick (1938-2002). 
Andre Glucksmann. and other. defend private property and a minimal state. 
Neo-Marxists like Herbert Marcuse (1 898-1979) still sustains good 
readership. 
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That is , Rawls is a defender of a welfare form of democracy , but is 
neither a defender of property rights nor of utilitarianism. His views 
find its historical antecedent in the moral philosophy of Immanuel 
Kant (1 724-1804) who argues for the objectivity and universality ()f 
certain moral principles. In particular , the categorical imperative ()[ 
Kant is paralleled by Rawls ’s idea that a just society is one 0 :1 
which each individual , no matter his/her situation in life , must be 
treated equally before the law,30 be given due process , and be the 
subject of equal concern of society. Interestingly, in tηing to define 
democracy , Robert A. Dahl, a lea디in당 authority on democracy , in a 
similar vein concludes that despite the multitude possibilities ()f 
definitiom‘’ “ political equality" 이‘ all members is most critical.:11 
Precisely these kinds of arguments give weight to egalitarianism in 
democracy. Without doubt, the concept o[ egalitarianism is central 
to modern-day democracies. 
We now turn to the controversies that Rawls ’s views mi당Lt 
stimulate in the eyes of the economisL Given the propositions 
briefly outlined above , Rawls had set himself to explain what mi당tt 
constitute an economically just society. It is p이itically just because 
of its commitment to certain basic freedoms , but he is uncom-
fortable that a society could be politically equitable in this sense 
and yet distribute its wealth in ways that are “ unfair." Although he 
does not object to the degree of, say, Marx , to a free society that 
exhibits differentials in wealth , he is unhappy with a society i.:1 
which inequali디es in wealth a110w some persons to fa11 below a 
minimum level with respect to the material conditions of existence 
This is his “ indifference principle" that holds that inequali디es in 
certain basic goods of society be allowed only when the distribution 
of primary goods of society benefit the worst off in society. t 
should be easy to see how Rawls ’ s thought is consistent with the 
government’s of Scandinavian countries , as we11 during different 
regimes in various countries as , say , England under the Labour 
government. Rawls position is a form of “ mitigated egalitarianisrn " 
as opposed to “ strict egalitarianism ," with respect to wealth in 
society. A good society, he argues , is one that counteracts the 
natural inequali디es deriving frorn birth , motivation , talent and 
circumstances , a11 features that tend to distribute wealth “ unfairly." 
30See footnote 26. 
31 0ahl (1998 , pp. 35-43). 
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Rawls ’s position has been criticized on at least two different 
fronts. The first derives from the Platonic point of view that people 
are innately different in their abilities. crea디띠ty. 없ld capacity to 
succeed. 없ld accordingly make inequitable contributions to socie양. 
As such. a ‘'just" society. should not disregard these differences. 
Robert Nozick has developed this kind of argument. 32 Secondly. 
Rawls’s notions of equality of distribution of wealth and the 
principles of poli디cal freedom in certain cases may run into 
opposition with one another. For example. it might be the case that 
certain members of society control most of the wealth to the extent 
that it is impossible for a large number of the citizens to live above 
the poverty line. A government might find that the elites not only 
control of much of the wealth of the socie양 but also control most 
of the organs of the state (press. courts. banks. etc.). say. even this 
being a result of the democratic process. Then. it follows that there 
is no democratic way that the economy can be “ corrected" without 
suspending the free exercise of voting rights in that society. That 
is. one of Rawls’s fundamental principle “ the freedom to vote." 
would have to be curtailed to bring about economic ‘ 'justice." The 
theory thus contains inconsistencies in that in the end it will have 
to give the government more power than a free society might allow. 
therefore leading towards centralization and increased state control. 
Today ‘ in many ways. the penetration of p이itics into economics 
is much crystallized in what is known as “ economic democracy." 
Largely brought on by the concern of poli디cal scientists that “ the 
existence of sizable inequalities in political resources among the 
citizens of a democratic country should be disturbing to anyone 
who places a high value on poli디cal equality."33 the intention of 
economic democracy is to bring the democratic process into the 
management and governance of the most important economic 
enterprise. the c(πpora디on. Dahl argues that the democratic 
process is a fundamental. even an inalienable right. which should 
find its way into the governance of economic corporations to help. 
above all. resolve the dilemma raised , at least since Alexis de 
Tocqueville two-volume masterpiece , Democracy in America, that 
“ democracy cannot exist without an excep디onal degree of social. 
economic. and political equality , yet that very equality so essential 
32See. Nozick (1 974). 
330따11 (1 985 , p. 53). 
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to democracy also threatens liberty."34 The question of the viability 
of economic democracy. a nonπ-trη.개1띠a떠1 prπrob비lem.π’ needs to be f1“urπrt야he 
m、vestiga리ted. Given the premises of this paper. however. the 
direction does not point favorably at economic democracy. especially 
given the egalitarian grounds upon which it is based. which 
conflicts in many ways deeply with the corporate hierarchical 
form.:15 
It is true that we have mainly looked at only those p이itical 
philosophies that champion “ equality" as a major theme. This is 
not to ignore. however. other important poli디cal writers from 
Rousseau to Nietzsche. and more recently Sartori. who are inclined 
to argue the opposite. that. for example. “ [i]nequality is “ natun: ’‘; 
equality is denaturalization."36 Be as it may. the issues of politics 
ancl economics are on their own never easy. It should however be 
enormously beneficial to cross over belween boundaries and 10 
understand Ihe impact and in f1uences of each on the other. VJe 
coulcl not agree more with Thomas Nagel. one of the most 
in f1uential and widely read livin팅 philosophers. who points to thc 
problem of balancing equali양 with what he calls “ partiality" as the 
most important issue with which political theorists are now faced 
with. 37 Political philosophers it would seern have already begun to 
take the question of “ political equality" and 갱conomic equalit y" 
seriously.38 The sarne. however. cannot be said about econornis1.s. 
Why? We have already pointed that the problem might lay in the 
lack of a “ grand" economic philosophy. How would economists 
know where to start if it has no place to draw its vision and stancl 
firmly in par against the great classical political philosophies 
discussed above? This has. in our opinion. been a greal handicap 
in the practice and thinking of economics. not least. wh간n 
addressing issues of econornic developrnent. 
340따11 (1 985. p. 35) 
35See Jwa (2002) to understand why “ economic democracy'‘ mi샤1 t 
contradict the corporation. For a discussion of corporate policy along the 
lines of 객conomic democracy" in Korea. as well as earlier discussions of t he 
principles of development economics. see Jwa (2004). 
36Saπori (l 9B7. p. 337). 
37Nagel (1991) 
3HSee for example. Oahl (1 985). 
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IV. ED and Classical and Neoclassical Economic Thought 
How should we understand ED in the context of classical and 
contemporary economic thOU!강lt? This section will provide some 
cues in placing ED in the body of economic thought. Similarities 
and differences of the ED approach compared to the classical and 
neoclassical school should help the reader judge the potential value 
of the ED paradigm. The British mathematician , logician and 
philosopher, A1fred North Whitehead (1 861-1947) once remarked 
that, “ The safest general characterization of the European 
philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to 
Plato."39 It would not be mistaken to make a similar statement 
about Adam Smith (1 723-9이， the father of economics , to whose 
classical works many economists after him have returned in search 
for guidance and wisdom. In this section , fl이10뼈ng tradition , we 
begin by taking a look at the concept of ED on the backdrop of the 
economics and philosophy of Adam Smith. 
In the 19th Century, under the weight of Hobbesian political 
ideas , it was widely held that ordinary people needed the guidance 
of their “ betters" • the wise and the virtuous-who would put into 
place a good p이itical system that would both try to restrain the 
lower classes from self-destructive behaviors 없ld pro띠de instruction 
in religion and virtue. The Wealth oJ Nations provided a drastic 
different view of the world , where individual liberty , and not least 
in the produc디on and exchange of goods and services. would result 
in socially desirable outcomes (under the guidance of the “ invisible 
hand"). Large parts of Smith ’s work can be viewed as 띠ndicating 
ordinary people’s judgments , and fending off attempts by phi 
losophers and policymakers to replace those judgments with the 
supposedly better “ systems" invented by intellectuals. 
In a sense , Smith seems to have single handedly established the 
liberal tradition in economics based largely on methodological 
individualism.40 Smith's account of moral and poli디cal cognition is 
3~llitehead (l929) 
40Methodological individualism is the belief that the social sciences should 
be looked primarily from the viewpoint of individual decision makers. One of 
the best ex와nples of methodological individualism was the defense of logical 
reasoning by the Austrian School of economics as against the Historical 
School's promotion of statistical analysis in the Methodenstreit. In fact. the 
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however strikingly egalitarian. ancl. in some ways. even anti-elitis t. 
The thrust of his arguments is that experts know less than th('y 
claim to know. and ordinary people know rnore than they seern 10 
know. about what will best promote the human goOd. 41 ThlS 
egalitarian view of Smith’ s hurnan cognition can be seen 깅 S 
providing the essential premise for Smith ’s arguments against 
governrnent interference in the economy. With the exception of the 
provision of some (public) goods. which individuals. left 10 
themselves. would not adequately handle (like defense and the 
administration of jus디ce). the prescrip디on is to minimize the role of 
the government. 42 This view, however. does not sit well with the 
experiences of the late industrializing coun1.ries of the 20th Century 
like Korea. Japan. Singapore , recently China , and others , where the 
government has been instrumenta:l in leading economic take-off and 
developmen t. As will be discussed later. 1.he ED paradigrn is n이 
bound by the debate between governrnent ’s versus rnarket's role in 
economic development. and hence ‘ it is easier to explain economic 
experiences of rnost nations rnore consistently. 
\Vhile Smith seerns to have helped establish the liberal tradition 
regarding economic participation in the rnarket. he has on thc 
other hand helped promote , .although quite innocently , the 
egalitarian view as well. The political notion of “ equal rights" (and 
equal opportunities) , discussed in the previous section , had found 
in Smith an ideal partner with the “ egalitarianism" of rnarkets ,43 
and over the course of history, many poli디cal philosophers and 
prac디tioners have been quick 1.0 arrange for the marriage of 
market-capitalism and egali1.arian politics. However , when the truth 
of markets are revealed in distinct economic differences , govern. 
term “ methodological individualism" seems to have been invented by Joseph 
Schumpeter in 1908 (See Biaug (1978. p. 49)) 
41 “ Every individual intends only his own gain. and he is in this , as in so 
many other cases. led by an invisible hand to promote an end which wεs 
no part of his intention .... By pursuing his own interest he frequently 
promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends 10 
promote it." (Smith 1776 , p. 423). 
42Smith‘ s distrust of the ability of ‘ systems" - whether philosophica 1• 
religious. or political- to improve the human condition goes with a belid 
that what really provides us with moral education are the humb e 
institutions of everyday social interaction. including the market. 
431n rea1ity. markets are never egalitarian. but are discriminatory. In a 
sense. markets are the epitome of ED. We explain this shortly. 
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ments , especially when having to address the pressing issues of 
wealth and income differences , have been equally quick to push 
further the εgalitarian ethos (i. e. mostly borne on ethical grounds) 
to try drive back the inevitable economic “discrepancies. " 
Economics , in the mean time , had no way to insulate itself from 
such fierce p이I디cal drive , because the economic machinery 
including its institutions , policymakers and scholars , in many ways , 
have been already deeply immersed in the ideals of egalitarianism 
that political philosophy has helped establish. 
Although to digress a little , it might be useful to interpret 
markets under the ED paradigm. Simply put, markets mean 
nothing without real economic players and without ED. Hence , in 
the neoclassical formulation - absent real economic entities - markets 
are nothing more than a vacuum in which (imagined) interaction is 
assumed. In the real world , any transaction or exchange cannot be 
dissociated 띠th discrimination on the part of the economic players 
(consumers , firms , government, etc.). In real markets , what is 
involved is ED of an orchestra of discrimination amongst economic 
players. Put slightly differently, the market can be viewed as a 
collection of discriminators , and as such , the primaπ function of 
markets , its essence then is to discriminate , i. e. constantly evaluate 
and reward market players and their behavior. And , as a 
consequence o[ its ED function , markets naturally promote the 
conglomeration of economic entities (안 Corollary 2). Furthermore , 
we might add that the market can be seen as impersonally and 
“ objectively" treating differences as differences in a most rigorous 
manner - the market is a tireless economic discriminator. 44 
Returning to Smith , by realizing the importance of cogniiion in 
economics , as we have already discussed , in many ways Smith 
seems to have anticipated our ED paradigm. It would seem to us 
that Smith , in fac t. was the first to set economics on the path to 
the proper understanding of development. Sam Fleischacker, an 
authority on Smith , points out that the famous economic historian 
George Stigler (1 911-91) might have misread Smith , together with 
44It also follows that we can defined “ market failure" as the situation in 
which markets become “ blind" to ED ‘ i.e. ED becomes defunct , say. when 
1) there are extreme economies of scale that lead to a “ natural monopoly." 
and 2) there is no production due to extemalities that make it impossible 
to identify those responsible for production (hence it becomes impossible to 
know whom to reward) 
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many other economists after him , in believing that , “ the Wealth 'J.f 
Nations is a stupendous palace erected upon the granite Jf 
self-interes t. "45 Far more important to Smith‘ s work is the beIief Jf 
ordinary people ’ s understanding oî their own interests without help 
frorn superiors. lt is in this sense that we would not be mistakt n 
to say that the distinctive mark of Smith’s thought is his view Df 
hurnan cognition , and not of human motivation. 46 Needless to say , 
the theory of ED is firmly grounded on hurnan cognition. 
Moving from the classical to the neoclassical school, we will 
compactly discuss the neoclassic ::cù framework47 in relation to the 
discrimination paradigm. A major reason why neoclassical eC I)-
nomics seems to have failed to address developmental issues , and 
this has been a widely discussed criUcism in the literature , is th‘1t 
its assump디ons and method have largely missed the idea Jf 
development. 48 Most critical. neoc!assical economics seems unable 
to comprehend the highly diverse , lopsided and unbalanced natu.~e 
(cf. Corollaries 1 and 2) of developmen t. What more , neoclassi c:::t! 
economics can hardly appreciate features of conglorneratio i1‘ 
differences in size and quality of econornic、 entities ‘ etc. given th ‘1t 
it commonly opts for assumptions such as identical producls , 
identical agents and firms , perfect information , and so on. 
Most worrisome is the fact that many of the premises that the 
neoclassical rnethod stands on make it highly susceptible .0 
egalitarian principles. The Pareto efficiency criterion , for example ‘ 
4"Stigler (1975‘ p. 237). 
4E 
’See Fleischacker (2004). 
47We acknowledge that the neoclassical economics is not a single school , 
but rather a collection of a number of important and in f1uential schools of 
thought in economics , and in fact there is not complete agreement on what 
is meant by neoclassical economics , particular in terms of its vision , 
problem domains , 없ld concerns , which vaπ amongst economists working 
with the neoclassical method. With the risk of overgeneralization. howevcr , 
we will understand the neoclassical method as one involving the opli-
mization , marginal problem 없ld the concept of equilibria , which assume 
three basic assumptions , i.e. , 1) people have rational preferences among 
outcomes ‘ 2) individuals maximize utility and [irms maximize profits , and 3) 
people act independently on the basis of full and relevant information 
48이Ne do not ignore Milton Friedman's argument that a theory should b(' 
only judged by its predictions , not by its assumptions. Yet , it is cliffjcult (() 
ignore the j낀 ct that results are often bounded by assumptions , ancl if the 
la((er are defective ‘ then it cannot prυrnise to hold the key to sorne criti( al 
questio !1 S 
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has been the theoretical standpoint upon which many redistribution 
and welfare systems have been based. Specifically, the criteria for 
Pareto efficiency allocation is one in which there is no other 
allocation in which an individual is beUer off and no other 
individuals are worse off. and furthermore. it is assumed that each 
individual only considers what (s)he receives. The Pareto optimality 
condition , if interpreted by its static assumptions , contains in it 
many contradictions. i.e .. it is unable to differentiate between , 1) an 
individual rewarded by all the produce “ in the world" due to 
his/her efficiency. and 2) all reward (generated by the best (or 
beUer) individual(s)) is allocated to other (“less deserving") 
individuals. In both cases , in the static sense , the final outcomes 
are an improvement or , at least. not in any case a dis-improvement 
for any of the individuals. and as such. economic allocation can be 
interpreted as a Pareto efficient allocation. Case 2. however , is not 
“ agreeable" wi단1 respect to the ED paradigm. and particularly the 
dictum “ to each according to his/her contribution." Moreover , it is 
incentive diminishing. i. e.. the “ developmental ladder" can be seen 
to be laid dov.π1 ， 49 a situation that gets even worse if such 
allocation is not the intention of the individual(s) in question. but 
rather the design of some third , autonomous party (e.g. government 
policy). On the other hand , a situation in which reward is “ taken 
away" from some individuals (e.g. when clearly inefficient players 
are knocked out of the market) and allocation of “ residual" 
resources go to beUer individual(s ), although Pareto inefficien t, it is 
easy to see how the ED process is strengthened. In sum. although 
it might be justified to adopt a distribution policy on the basis of 
the (static) Pareto efficiency criteria. we wam that care should be 
taken that the society’s ED structures are not sacrificed. 
On passing. it is interesting to note that ED need not involve 
moral judgment. which is a break from the socio-political context in 
which the term “ discrimination" is so often used. Standards. we 
might add , are often endogenously defined. sometimes informally 
(culture and norms) and sometimes formally (rules and laws) , which 
act as overall constraints to economic behavior. The idea of 
“ standards" almost parallels that of the New Institutional Economics 
(NIE) , as it can easily take on non-economic factors. such as 
culture. politics , religion , and so on , into the body of analysis 
49Litt1e does the Pareto criteria say about incentives 
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Douglass North argues , to which we agree , that in neoclassical 
theOIγ ， the scarcity and hence competition assumption has been 
robust. but “、，vhat has been missing is an understanding o[ the 
nature of human coordination ancl cooperation."50 To this criticism ‘ 
the NIE has integrated institutions into the body o[ economi(‘ 
theory. From our perspective , ratber than emphasizing institutions ‘ 
which has been criticized to be a somewhat slippery concept (e.g .. 
“What types of institutions are relevantT).51 ED is a more 
appropriate and precise notion to understanding the economic 
development process. Simply pu t. only those institutions that are 
discriminatory can be compatible with economic developmen t. 
v. Politics, Economics and Development 
In the abstract form , any socio-economic system can be eithcr 
discriminatory , in the sense of the defini ti.on given in this paper ‘ cr 
non-discriminatory. Be as it may , we prefer to maintain a more 
realistic notion of discrimination • All forms of interaction are 
discriminatorγ ， pcriod. Discrimination is ubiquitous , as wc havc 
already described. and a society can either choose to intensify or to 
mitigate it (i.e .. move away or towards equalization). On the othcr 
hand , po1itical philosophy has been concerned with the questio 1 
“Who should rule?" and has debated rigorously the notions ()f 
p이1디cal Hberty and political equality. To help visualize the poliUcal 
and economics views better. we might use the political-economy 
matrix of social order below. 
Table 1 shows two possible social orders , n an1ely , the “ poliUcal 
order" 없ld the “ economic order." In turn , each of these orders 
might take on two extreme forms. Namely, with respect to the 
political order, we have A) individuals above the state (liberty and 
“ equal rights ," 센 Iρckian and Mills). 와ld B) state above individuals 
(authoritarian , cf Hobbesian and Marxian). and; with respect to the 
economic order , we have C) discrimination (cf “ reward according to 
one's contribution"). and D) egalitarianism (cf equal outcome). c,2 
50 North (1990 , p. 10). 
51See Rodrick (2000) and Glaeser. La POπa. Lopez-de-Silanes. ‘md Shleifcr 
(2004) 
52 Note that we have completely a、roicled the c1assical debate of governmelll 
versus mιrkets in economic development. The ED paradigm. we hol <1. 
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TABLE 1 







With respect A) , what should be further noted is that the notion 
of liberty. especi허ly under the one-m하1 one-vote democracy. tends 
to automatically invoke 삼1e eg려ltarian ethos under which inru-
viduals are assigned “ equal rights" allowing them to paπicipate in 
government. This aspect of liberty, we have argued , has often been 
carried over to me밍1 the equ외ity of economic outcomes. which has 
adversely affected economic progress. i. e. the notion of “ equality" is 
carried out to me와1， in economics , eg려itari하1ism (i. e. , trea디ng 
differences equally) or "equ허 outcomes." 
The separation into a poli디cal 윈1d economics order is just for 
an려ytic convenience. and in the real world , we will undoubtedly 
have one of the four possible combinations of politics and 
economics regimes. The possible combinations are , 1) (A+C) Market 
democracy. 2) (B + D) Totalitarian regime. 3) (A + 0) Social 
democracy or the welfare state. and 4) (B+C) Developmental state. 
To see this more clearly. it will be useful to cross coorrunate the 
econom1cs order (discrimination-egalitarian) and the poli디cal order 
(liber민-authoritari잉1). thereby bringing together into one place the 
central themes of this paper. The political-economy axis of social 
order is shown below: 
In Figure 1. the vertical a찌s represents ED and eg.외itarianism on 
opposite ends of a continuum. P디nciple 1 states that ruscrimination 
is a necessary conrution for economic deve10pmen t. and as already 
argued. the market system is , in fact. the epitome of the ED 
process. Hence. the higher up the veπic려 scale. 야le more íntense 
the ED (e.g.. the US. Sweden. England. Germany in the 1950s and 
1960s. Japan (Meiji restoration period) , Korea in 삼le 1960s and 
1970s. etc.) . On the other hand. Principle 2 states that 
egalit.a디anism sets the economy into 이gression. which is placed at 
the lower end of the vertical a씌s (e.g .. North Korea. former Soviet 
provides a more consistent and clearer explanation of p이itic외 and economic 
development experiences. 
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POLlTICAL-E CONOMY AxIs OF S OClAL ORDER 
Union . England in the 1950s to early 1980s . presenl day Korea 
and Germany. etc.). Let us explain a little furLher how Lh，~ 
poliUc외-economy a잉s might be useful in explaining the relative 
strengths of developmental poten디려s of various countries that Jj ~ 
in any of the four possible quadra nts or regimes. Korea in the two 
decades of the 1960s and 1970s has shown strong ED under an 
authoritarian regime. and accordingly would have placed h er in Lh e 
NW quadrant. toge납ler with other developmental states such as 
earlier Japan (Meiji restoration period). present day China, and 
other rapi이y growing Asi없1 countries like Singapore and Malaysia .. 
In the NE quadrant of the combinations of hìgh ED and liberty. we 
can expect to find the most advanced market economies such as 
the UK and the US. including the not so obvious Sweden. .3. 
country that has adopted a social democratic government. but 
which at the same time has built into its socio-economic fabri c 
strong ED mech anisms .53 The SE quadrant contains many of the 
current welfa re states inclu띠ng France a nd present-day Germany 
53F'or a Iively discussion on Sweden. see Henrekson and J akobsson 
(200 1) . 
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and Korea , which has been on a mitigated ED path from as far 
back as the late-1980s , Lastly , the SW quadrant contains countries 
such as the former USSR and China under the Mao regime , where 
authoritarianism and egalitarianism were strongly pursued. 54 
1t is interesting also to note that the NE and SW quadrants are 
“ naturals." That is , on the one hand, liberalism and discrimination 
are internally consistent with individual freedoms , while , on the 
other hand , authoritarianism and egalitarianism are not only 
compatible , but also complimentary in that to enforce egalitar-
ianism , authoritarianism is the most required. While both the 
liberal-discrimination and authoritarian-egalitarian regimes do not 
contain internal contradictions , the former , because it embodies ED 
is economically sustainable and preferred , while the laUer is 
economically unsustainable because of its gravitation towards 
egalitarianism. On the other hand , what are known as devel-
opmental states (NW quadrantl and welfare democracies (SE 
quadrantJ, contain in them an important contradiction. spec피cally 
between liberty and equ려ity ， and as such , their existence and 
sustainability in history has been somewhat uncommon. Put 
differently. the welfare state looks like a natural, but this is so only 
if seen from the political perspective. As mentioned earlier , political 
philosophies often invoke egalitarian ethos , but in economics ‘ 
unlike political discussions , egalitarianism is seen to work against 
individual liberties. and hence to sustain the welfare state , some 
degree of authoritarian rule and less ED is usually invoked. This 
will over time will harm economic development, and as such it is 
not a real 끼atural" - simply put, it is economica11y unsustainable 
by Prin디ple 2 i.e. egalitarianism 띠11 lead to economic co11apse. 
Similarly. the developmental state can be seen as a natural 
through a purely economics perspective. 1n fac t. this para11els ED 
by command or by government. However , as before , we need not 
make the same error , and looking at such a regime from the 
political view , because of mitigated liberty , might not grant this 
54Judging from the experiences of Germany and England , as well as the 
US. it would seem it take a duration of about one genera디on (30 years) to 
switch from the egalitarian to ED. and vice versa. This suggests that there 
are idiosyncratic features that are ingrained into a generation that make 
them inclined to favor either egalitarianism or ED. Of course. if a country 
refuses to take heed of economic stagna디on due to of egalitarianism. the 
깨galitari없1 trap" can become elongated. 
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regime much [a、!o r.
The description o[ the above is not unrelated to the question (,[ 
markets versus governments that is common in the economic policy 
literature. For example. when re[erring to the developmental state. 3. 
common dilemma o[ economis떠 밍1d P이icymakers has been 
whether to promote the role o[ markets or o[ governments to aUain 
certain national goals. With the collapse of the former Soyjet Union. 
many economists are quick to champion markets over governmentE .. 
and today. followjng Smith. a minimal government is seen as 
desirable. This dichotomy of markets versus governments is too 
simplistic a yjew. which. although a l!oMng for interesting discus-
sion of world events. can lead to serious rnistakes. The battle on 
the field should not be placed in the context of markets versus 
governments , but rather. whether ED is being augmented or 
rnitigated (possible by governments or by markets. or both , 
According to our argument. it is ED that should not b~ 
compromised for economic development. Simply put. any economic 
political regime becomes viable if the ED is augrnented and 
egalitaríanism toned down. 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
A clearer distinction of p이itical and economic factors cf 
development is fundamental to the better understanding o[ t11:: 
relationship between political institutions and economic develop 
ment. Amongst political philosophers. eg떠itari밍1ism has centered 
as the ideal towards which much of the poli디cal discourse to dat~ 
has aimecl. This. we have warned contained in it, almost unnoticeè. 
the seeds to distort the economic developmental process. the mor~ 
the ef[ect i[ allowed to adversely alTect economic liberties as well as 
economic outcomes. The economic discrimination (ED) paradigm 
presented in this paper pro띠des a way of looking at the economi2 
development process from what we believe ought to be the 
economic yjew (i. e. in contrast to the political yjew). In so doing. w~ 
proyjcle a contrasting perspective to classic:al political philosophy ‘ 
i.e.. the ED paradigm. whic:h takes on a “ vertical" yjew of the world 
as we re-visit the meaning and essenc:e of development. 
The c:entral question that this paper addresses is not at all 
trivial. Political institutions based on egalitarianism. culminating in 
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the modem democracy , has within it the deadly poten디al to 
nega디vely impact economic development. Dahl (1998) puts it that 
democracy through the logic of equality and based on the notion of 
poli디cal (intrinsic) equ허ity55 will always be in conflict with 
market-capitalism. Up to this point, we would agree with Dahl. Like 
many others , however , he is unhappy that market-capitalism 
inevitably generates inequ려ities ， which is said to seriously impair 
poli디cal equality and the ideals of democracy.56 Dahl and others 
seem to give the impression that the market-capitalism should be 
“ corrected" to allow for political equ려ity. This is something that we 
are not prepared to accept. Even more disturbing is the proposition 
of economic democracy , which contains in it the very seeds to 
corporate digression. 57 We have seen that the perceived “ conflict" 
between market economies and democracy must be seen as 
pivoting around ED (깐 the political-economy él)강s of social order) , 
and hence , irrespec디ve of whatever political jacket a government (or 
corporation) might wear , it is precisely egalitarian-seeking regimes 
(or policy) that tend to hinder and reverse the ED mechanisms in 
favor of the equalization of outcomes , thereby becoming a major 
force behind economic slowdown. In sum. there is need therefore to 
be cautious about equality-seeking politics and their potential 
negative impact on economic progress. 
In general. Dahl’ s insistence on asking whether there is “ a 
feasible alternative to market-capitalism that would be less 
injurious to political equali양?" seems to be a wrongly posed 
ques디on. at least from the 찌ewpoint of economics. Here. again. 
witness how easily questions are framed (and influenced) under 
political intonations. As much as we would like to provide an 
answer to Dahl in a favorable light , our analysis shows that the 
political view, specifically, egalitarian-based democracy , has within it 
fatal poten디al to do great injustices to economics , and par디cularly ， 
economic development. In fact , we would rather have the question 
55He does seem to be a Iittle confused when he writes that. “ the claim 
that the truth of intrinsic equ떠ity is self-evident strikes me. and no doubt 
many others. as highly implausible" (Dahl 1998. p. 65). but argues 
nevertheless that we should adopt it. 
56“ There is a permanent tension between democracy and a market-
capitalist economy" (DahI 1998. pp. 158-9) 
57The classic case is Korea’s adop디on of “ economic democracy" in her 
constitution since 1987 
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be placed on its head to read. “ 15 there an alternative democratic 
system that would be less injuri.ous to ED and. hence. economic 
development?" To this. we have suggested throughout this paper 
that there is a solution. i. e. a democracy should be formed thεt ‘ 
arguably. need not emphasize “ equality." while at the same time. 
does not sacrifice individual liberties and ED. Indeed. reconciliation 
between a variety of political regimes on the one hand and the ED 
approach on the other can be reached under the ED paradigm. Of 
course. we do not intend to divorce economics from politics -- this is 
hardly possible in the real world - but. we sincerely hope that we 
have argued our case of the peπasiveness and dangers of 
egalitarianism in economic life. Political institutions and economic 
development are compatible. if only the ED is not sacrificed. 
(Received 4 November 2004: Reviscd 20 December 2004) 
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